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THE TERMINATION OF WAR. 
T HE termination of war must, at the outset, be distinguished from the termination of hostilities or actual warfare. As has 
been said, wax: is "not the mere employment of force, but the exist-
ence of the legal condition of things in which rights are or may be 
prosecuted by force. Thus, if two nations declare war one against 
the other, war exists, though no force whatever may as yet have 
been employed."1 Similarly, it follows that, although actual hostili-
ties have ceased, the status of war may continue until terminated in 
some regular way recognized by international law as sufficient for 
that purpose. Actual hostilities are frequently terminated as the 
result of the signing of an armistice or a capitulation which may 
take the form of a protocol or preliminary agreement which regu-
lates the relations between the belligerents until the definitive treaty 
of peace is signed and ratified. 
There is no question that the President has full power to bring 
about the suspension of hostilities on his sole authority. Thus, dur-
ing the Spanish-American War, actual hostilities were suspended 
by the protocol of August 12, 1898, (which was not submitted to the 
Senate) and by Presidential proclamation of the same date.2 But, 
as the Supreme Court pointed out: "A state of war did not in law 
cease until the ratification in April, 1899, of the treaty of peace. 'A 
truce or suspension of arms,' says Kent, 'does not terminate the 
war, but it is one of the commercia belli which suspends its opera-
tions * * * At the expiration of the truce, hostilities may recom-
mence without any fresh declaration of war'."3 With reference to 
this point, the attorney-general of the United States took the same 
view, declaring that "notwithstanding the signing of the protocol 
and the suspension of hostilities, a state of war between this country 
and Spain still exists. Peace has not been declared and cannot be 
declared except in pursuance of the negotiations between the peace 
commissioners authorized by the protocol."4 Moreover, a recogni-
tion of the continuation of the war in spite of the suspension of hos-
tilities and the signing of the protocol was expressed in the definitive 
1 Mo0Rr:'s DIGSST oF INT. LAw, VII, 153 • 
• 30 STAT. AT L., 1780. 
• Hijo v. United States, 194 U. S. 315, at p. 323. 
• 22 OP. U. S. A'rTY.-GsN. 191. (Aug. 24, 18g8). For qualification of 
the latter part of the Attorney-General's statement, see below. 
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treaty of peace which, in the preamble, mentioned the desire of the 
two parties "to end the war now e~isting between the two coun-
tries."5 
The principle thus upheld by the Supreme Court, by the Attorney-
General and by the treaty-making authority would seem to be too 
well established to be questioned. Nevertheless, in view of the 
lengthy delay which has followed the signing of the armistices with 
Germany and Austria-Hungary in November, 1918, due to the fail-
ure of the President and Senate to agree upon the terms of a defin-
itive treaty, some question has been raised as to whether our status 
since the suspension of hostilities is one of war or of peace. Diplo-
matic relations with 'the Central Powers remain severed, but com-
mercial relations with Germany have been to some extent resumed.e 
President Wilson, in transmitting to Congress on November II, 
1918, the terms of the armistice, made the statement that "the war 
thus comes to an end, for having accepted these terms of the armis-
tice it will be impossible for the German command to renew it." 
The President could scarcely have intended by this statement to in-
dicate his belief that the war h~d been legally terminated, but 
merely that for practical purposes actual warfare was at an end. 
The above statement of the President, however, was construed by 
a lower·Federal court as equivalent to an official proclamation by the 
President of the end of the war. The question before the court 
involved the construction of a provision of an act of Congress of 
1917 which made criminal certain conduct if committed "during the 
present war." The court declined to order the penalty inflicted, on 
the ground that the war had in fact ended upon the announcement 
of the President.7 
This, however, does not seem to have been a well-considered case. 
Even though the statement of the President had been intended as 
an official proclamation of the legal end of the war, it is somewhat 
doubtful whether the President could thus, by his sole act, upon the 
mere signing of an armistice with a foreign belligerent, bring the 
war to a legal termination. · It is true that the Supreme Court seems 
• I MAI.LOY, TRtA~, II, l6go. 
• Limited intercourse with the enemy may be permitted, even during 
hostilities, by act of Congress prescribing th~ conditions under which it 
may be carried on. Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 73. 
• U. S. v. Hicks, 256 Fed. 707 (1919). 
THE TERMINATION OF WAR 821 
to have held that the Civil War was ended in different states on dif-
ferent dates by Presidential proclamations.8 In case Congress had 
by act or joint resolution adopted a different date as the end of the 
Civil War from that mentioned in the President's proclamation, it 
is not clear that the court would not have followed the determination 
of Congress rather than of the President. Congress, however, in a 
ptatute continuing a certain :i:ate of pay to soldiers in the army did 
so "for three years after the close of the rebellion, as announced by 
the President" in his proclamation.9 Congress thus adopted the date 
set by the President, and the Supreme Court, in other cases, seems 
to take the actions of both the President and Congress into consid-
eration in determining the date of the conclusion of the Civil War.10 
Even though it should be held that the proclamation oi the Presi-
dent alone was sufficient to terminate the Civil War, nevertheless 
it is to be remembered that that war, though having in some of its 
aspects the characteristics of a war between independent states, was 
in other respects a mere domestic insurrection which was suppressed 
by the overthrow ·of the insurrectionary government. Hence the 
method to be pursued in determining the date of the conclusion of 
the Civil War might well be different from that to be followed in 
the case of a foreign war in which the foreign belligerent still has a 
government in existence at the termination of hostilities. At any 
rate, as indicated above, in the case of the armistices with the Central 
Powers, the President's announcement to Congress is not to be con-
sidered as an official proclamation of the legal termination of the 
war. 
Congress has given evidence by its acts that it did not regard the 
signing of the armistices of r9r8 and the announcement by the Pres-
ident as bringing the war to a legal termination. Thus, after the 
armistice of November II, Congress passed and on November 2r, 
1918, the President approved the War-time Prohibition Act, which 
• The Protector, 12 '\Vall. 700; 14 STAT. AT L., 8u, 814 
D 14 STAT. AT L., 422. 
20 U. S. v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56, 70; McE1rath v. U. S., 102 U. S. 438; 
Lamar v. Browne, 92 U. S. 187. In the Anderson case, the court said: 
"As Congress, in its legislation for the army has determined that the Re-
bellion closed on the 20th day of August, 1866, there is no reason why its 
declaration on this subject should not be received as settling the question 
wherever private rights are affected by it." 
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made illegal the sale of distilled spirits for beverage purposes "after 
June 30, 1919, until the conclusion of ¢.e present war and thereaf-
ter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which shall 
be determined and proclaimed by the President"11 The validity of 
this act was attacked in the Supreme Court of the United States on 
the ground, among others, that demobilization had been effected, 
that the war had been concluded, .and that thereby the war emer-
gency upon which the operation of the act had been predicated was 
removed. . The court, however, denied the contention and upheld 
the validity and continued operation of the act of Congress in spite 
of the cessation of hostilities. "In the absence," said the court, "of 
specific provisions to the contrary the-period of war has been held 
to extend·to the ratification of the Treaty of Peace or the proclama-
tion of peace. * * * 'Conclusion of the war' dearly did not mean 
cessation of hostilities; because the act was approved ten days after 
hostilities had ceased upon the signing of the armistice. Nor may 
we assume that Congress intended by that phrase to designate the 
date when the Treaty of Peace should. be signed at Versailles or 
elsewhere by German and American representatives, since by the 
Constitution a treaty is only a proposal until approved by the Sen-
ate." The court also held that the President's statement that "the 
war thus comes to an end" was meant in a popular sense and was 
not an official proclamation of the termination of _the war.12 
In addition to the War-time Prohibition Act, many other acts of 
Congress passed during the World War provided that they should 
remain in force until -the termination of the war or until a varying 
length of time thereafter. Thus, in the Trading with the Enemy 
Act of 1917, it is provided that "the words 'end of the war' as used 
herein shall be deemed to mean the date of proclamation of exchange 
of ratifications of the treaty of peace, unless the President shall, by 
proclamation, declare a prior date, in which case the date so pro-
claimed shall be deemed to be the 'end of the war' within the mean-
ing of this act."13 This and corresponding provisions in other war-
time acts of Congress indicate that it was the expectation of that 
body that the war would end normally with a treaty of peace, but 
the provision just quoted seems to indicate that Congress also 
11 40 S'.l'A'l'. A'.!' L., 1045, 1046. 
12 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146. 
:IS 40 STA'.!'. AT L., 412. 
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thought that the war might terminate at a prior date by Presidential 
proclamation. It is not to be supposed from this, however, that 
Congress necessarily intended to intimate that a foreign war could 
be terminated by mere presidential proclamation without a treaty 
of peace, since this was the exercise by Congress of the power, not 
to terminate war nor to determine the duration of the war in the 
international sense, but merely to determine the period during which 
one of its acts should remain in force. 
The normal and usual method of terminating war between for-
eign nations is by a formal treaty of peace. The wars in which the 
United States has been engaged have been almost invariably so term-
inated. In the case of the Spanish-American War as indicated above 
the definitive treaty of peace was preceded by a preliminary agree-
ment, which also included the armistice, providing for the suspen-
sion of hostilities. In the cases of the War of 1812 and the Mex-
ican War, there was no armistice nor preliminary agreement, but 
the definitive treaty of peace was signed while hostilities were still 
in progress. Even in the cases of the wars with the Barbary states, 
in which, as we have seen, no formal declaratfons of war were is-
sued by the United States, treaties of peace were negotiated. The 
warlike operations conducted between the United States and F.rance 
in 1798 did not, as we have seen, constitute a full-fledged war, and 
the treaty of l8oo by which amicable relations between the two 
countries were restored was not, strictly speaking, a treaty of peace. 
Most of the treaties of peace to which the United States has been 
a party mention .in the preamble the desfr:e ·of the parties to end the 
war existing between them. The French treaty of 1800, however, 
speaks of the desire of the parties merely "to terminate the differ-· 
ences" which have arisen between them.14 
While it is generally recognized that a treaty of peace is the 
normal and usual method of terminating a war between foreign 
nations, the question may be raised as to whether this is the sole 
method which the United States can adopt in terminating a foreign 
war. That it is the sole method has sometimes been asserted by 
good authorities. Thus, in the course of his opinion in the case of 
Ware v. Hylton in the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice 
Chase said: "A war between two nations can only be concluded by 
l• MAI.LOY, fuATn:S, I, 4g6. 
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·treaty."15 Again, Senator Lodge, chairman of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, said on the floor of Congress: "Peace can be made 
only by the President and Senate."18 These statements, however, 
were obiter and cannot be accepted as conclusive of the matter. It 
does not follow that, pecause all the previous foreign wars in which 
· the United States has been engaged have been ended by treaty, that 
is the only way in which such a war of the United States may be 
ended. 
There are three ways generally recognized in international law 
whereby war may be terminated. Coleman Phillipson, at the begin-
ning of his work on the subject, states them as follows: "(1) by a 
mere cessation of hostilities on both sides, without any definite un-
derstanding supervening; (2) by the conquest and subjugation of 
one of the contending parties by the other, so that the former is 
reduced to impotence and submission; (3) by a mutual arrange-
ment embodied in a treaty of peace, whether the honors of war be 
equal· or unequal."17 
With reference to the power of the United States to terminate 
war in these three ways, it ·has sometimes been questioned whether 
the United States is empowered to terminate war by the conquest 
and subjugation of the enemy. This doubt is based upon a state-
ment by Chief Justice Taney in the case of Fleming v. Page in which 
he said: "The genius and character of our institutions are peace-
ful, and the power to declare war was not conferred upon Congress 
for the purposes of aggression or aggrandizement * * * A war, 
therefore, declared by Congress, can never be presumed to be waged 
for the purpose of conquest or the acquisition of territory; nor does 
the law declaring the war imply an authority to the President to en-
large the limits of the United States by subjugating the enemy's 
country."18 In the same opinion, however, the Chief Justice admits 
that, by the laws and usages of nations, conquest is a valid title, and 
it has been recognized.by the Supreme Court that the United States 
has full powers in international relations that other sovereign and 
independent nations have.19 Certainly, the courts would not inter-
.. 3 Dall. 236. 
'"C0Ncro:ss10NAL ~coRD, April 21, l9I4. Vol. 51, p. 6g6s. 
" Tr:RMIN ATION OF W AB. AND TRSATitS OF hAcE, p. 3. 
•• 9 How. 6o3, 614 
10 Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 6g8. 
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fere if the United States prosecuted a duly declared foreign war 
to the extent of subjugating the enemy and overthrowing his gov-
ernment. 20 
The termination of war by the reciprocal intermission of hostili-
ties has sometimes occurred. When, in r868, hostilities between 
Spain and Peru having ceased for several years without a treaty 
of peace, and the United States having offered to sell certain war-
ships to Peru, Spain protested that this action would violate our 
neutrality as the status of war still continued. Secretary of State 
Seward denied the Spanish contention, however, on the ground that 
the war had ended. "It is certain," he said, "that a condition of war 
can be raised without an authoritative declaration of war, and, on 
the other hand, the situation of peace may be restored by the long 
suspension of hostilities without a treaty of peace being made."21 
In case the United States should be a party to a war which re-
sulted in the complete subjugation CYf the enemy and the overthrow 
of his government or in the cessation of hostilities for a sufficient 
length of time to indicate that there is no intention of renewing 
them, there either would or could be no formal treaty of peace and 
the question would then arise as to where, in our government, the 
power to declare peace resides. Where war is ended by treaty, the 
treaty is primarily a contract or bargain between the powers con-
cerned, which is recognized as binding by international law if no 
duress has been exercised against the negotiators. Furthermore, in 
the United States, a treaty is a part of the supreme law of the land, 
and this is therefore a legal method of ending war. Subjugation of 
the enemy and long cessation of hostilities, however, are facts and 
not laws, though legal inferences and condusions may be built upon 
them. The question is, in our government,. what branch or author-
ity is competent to establish the legal inference that, as the result 
of such facts, the war is ended and peace is restored? 
The Constitution makes no specific grant of power to any branch 
of the government to make peace. In the Constitutional Conven-
tion, ho\vever, the matter came up for discussion on August r7, 
r787, in connection with the consideration of the power to make 
war. Mr. Pinckney was in favor of vesting the power to make war 
in the Senate, remarking that "it would be singular for one author-
00 Cf. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. I. 
"'DIP. CoR. 1868, II, 32, quoted by MooM, DIG. OF INT. LAW, VII, 336. 
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ity to make w~r and another peace," thus in4icating his belief that 
the power to make treaties, which at that stage in the proceedings 
was vested in the Senate alone, included the power to make peace.22 
This view was also held by Mr. Ellsworth, who declared that "there 
is a material difference between the cases of making war and mak-
ing peace. It should be more easy to get out of war than into it. 
War also is. a simple and overt declaration; peace attended with in-
tricate and ~ecret negotiations." Mr. Mason also was for "clogging 
rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace." When, 
therefore, it was moved to add "and peace" after "war" so as to 
give Congress the power· to declare war and peace, it was unani-
mously voted down.28 
The above proceedings of the Convention, together with those 
which took place in connection with the consideration of the treaty-
making power, indicate that the convention assumed that there was 
no such similarity in the methods to be pursued in declaring war 
and in making peace as that they should necessarily be vested in the 
same branch of government. W.hile the Convention assumed that 
the power to make treaties included the power to make peace, it 
did not exclusively vest the latter power by an express grant in any 
branch of the government, nor did it expressly deny to Congress 
such power. It may be that the Convention felt that if Congress 
were given the power to make peace, then such grant might be con-
strued as exclusive, and thus peace could not be made by the treaty-
making power and ·vice versa. There is nothing, however, to indi-
cate that the Convention considered at all the case where a war re-
sults in the subjugation of the enemy and the overthrow of his gov-
ernment so that no functionaries exist with which a treaty can be 
made C?r the case where hostilities have long since ceased and the 
treaty-making power is impotent to conclude peace on account of 
an irreconcilable difference of opinion between the President and the 
Senate over the terms of the treaty. Had these cases been <:onsid-
ered, it is not clear that the Convention would not have vested the 
power to declare peace under such circumstances in some body other 
than the treaty-making authority. 
The consideration of the second of the two cases mentioned above 
has recently become of prnctical importance on account of the fail-
"'JoURNAI. oF TH~ CoNSTITUTIONAI. CoNVr:NTION, [Hunt. Ed .. ] II, 188. 
23 Ibid., p. 189. 
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ure of the President and the Senate for a long time to agree upon 
the terms of the treaty of p"eace with Germany. In view of the 
deadlock between the -component parts of the treaty-making author-
ity, Congress essayed to take the initiative in restoring peace by 
passing a joint resolution for that purpose. The joint resolution, 
which was passed by Congress and vetoed by the President in May, 
1920, reads in part as follows: "That the joint resolution of Con-
gress passed April 6, 1917, declaring a state of war to exist between 
the Imperial German Government and the Government and people 
of the United States, and making provisions to prosecute the same, 
be, and the same is hereby, repealed, and said state of war is hereby 
declared at an end."24 
The question of the power of Congress to declare peace after a 
foreign war, not having ·before arisen in a practical form, has been 
comparatively little considered. Some expressions of opinion, how-
ever, have been made on the point and apparently contradictory 
statements can be found. Hare, in his work on the Constitution, 
says: "It is the right of the President, and not of Congress, to 
determine whether the terms (of peace) are advantageous, and if 
he refuses to make peace, the war must go on."25 Similarly, in the 
report of the Judiciary Committee of the forty-ninth Congress on 
the treaty power, made by John Randolph Tucker, it is stated that 
"Congress cannot create the status of peace by repealing its declara-
tion of war, because the former requires the concurrence of two 
wills, the latter but the action of one."28 In his work on the Con-
stitution, however, Tucker says: "Is there no end to the war ex-
cept at the will of the President and Senate? No authority can be 
cited on the question, but the writer thinks a repeal of a law requir-
ing war would be effectual to bring about the status of peace in 
place of war."27 Judge Baldwin appears to be of the same opinion. 
"Peace," he says, "could no doubt also be restored by an act of 
Congress. As a declaration of war takes ·the shape with us of a 
statute, it would seem that it can be repealed by a statute."28 A sim-
"'Co=-iGRESSIONAL Ri;coRD, May IS, 1920, Vol. 59, p. 768o. 
25 J. I. C. HAR£, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Vol. I, p. 171-2. 
'"Quoted by H. ST. G. TucK£R, "LIMITATIONS ON TH£ TR£A'J.'Y-MAKING 
Pow£R," p. 357. 
"']. R. TucKI;R, "TH£ CONSTITUTION oF THS UNITED STAT~," Vol. II, 
p. 7I8. 
""S. E. Baldwin in AM. Joun. OF INT. LAW, Vol. 12, pp. 13-14. 
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ilar conclusion is reached by Whiting, who says: "As it is in the 
power of the Legislative Department tb declare war, and to provide 
or withhold the means of carrying it on, Congress also may, after 
hostilities shall have ceased, declare or recognize peace."29 
The different statements quoted above appear to be somewhat 
contradictory, but they are capable of being, at least to some ex-
tent, reconciled. Hare and Tucker in the report cited are evidently 
speaking of a n~gotiated peace, which Congress confessedly cannot 
make since it has no means of carrying on pourparlers directly with a 
foreign government. In the exercise of its power to regulate foreign 
commerce, however, or in the exercise of some other granted power, 
Congress can pass a law embodying proposed terms of peace and can 
make the operation of such law contingent upon the consent of the 
enemy government being secured to such terms, but the communi-
cation of such terms to the enemy and the notification by the enemy 
of their acceptance must be transmitted through the President and 
such offer and acceptance would constitute an international agree-
ment if not a treaty. 'Baldwin a!ld Tucker in their treatise on the 
Constitution do not specify the sort of peace to which they are re-
ferring, and their statements, in the unqualified form in which they 
appear, cannot be fully accepted as invariably true. The determin-
ation of the question is dependent on collateral facts and circum-
stances, which differ in different cases. Whiting's statement, though 
general in form, doubtless refers primarily to the case of a civil 
war. Moreover, he does not assert the power of Congress to create 
a status of peace, but merely to declare or recognize its existence 
after hostilities shall ·have ceased. 
By the reciprocal intermission of hostilities if long continued, the 
concurring will to peace of the erstwhile enemy may be indicated 
without formal notification, especially if evidenced by some positive 
action that there is no intention of renewing them. It would hardly 
be maintained that Congress could end a foreign war by declaring 
peace in the midst of a campaign while the war is being actively 
waged on both sides. Of course, under the Constitution, Congress 
cannot appropriate funds for the support of the army for a longer 
period than two years, and Congress might withhold or limit appro-
priations for this purpose whether hostilities are in progress or not, 
and thus tie the hands of the President in prosecuting the war and 
20 W. Whiting, "War Powers Under the Constitution," [43rd Ed.], p. 312. 
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compel him to sue for peace, but such action on the part of Con-
gress would not end the war as a legal status. 
The passage of a peace resolution by Congress, based on the as-
sumption that the former enemy has no intention of further pros-
ecuting hostilities, would indicate that such is also no longer the 
intention of our Government so far as Congress can determine the 
policy of our Government in such a matter, and would have weight 
as coming from that branch of the Government whose action and 
cooperation are necesasry not only for the declaration of war but 
also for its vigorous prosecution. The passage of such a resolution 
would indicate that, so long at least as Congress remained of the 
same mind, funds for the further prosecution of the war would not 
be forthcoming. It would, if coupled with the continued cessation 
of hostilities by the former enemy, constitute a concurrent under-
taking to terminate the war without terms, but such action by Con-
gress would not preclude the subsequent making and ratification of 
a treaty defining the terms of peace. The concurrent undertaking 
to terminate the war might possibly be tacit if cessation of hostilities 
be sufficiently long continued, or the intention not to renew them 
might be indicated by positive action. In the case of the attempt 
to terminate war with Germany, the undertaking of that power not 
to renew hostilities was evidenced by her ratification of the Treaty 
of Versailles, which itself provided that, upon its coming into force, 
(which should happen upon its ratification by Germany and three 
of the allied and associated powers), the state of war should termi-
nate. In spite of this provision, however, the state of war between 
the United States and Germany continued in the absence of ratifica-
tion of the treaty by the United States, but, even so, the war could 
doubtless be terminated by a similar concurrent undertaking on the 
part of the United States not to renew hostilities, as evidenced by 
a joint resolution of Congress. 
A state of war may exist before it is formally declared by Con~ 
gress. It has been customary for Congress not to declare war, but 
to recognize by declaration the existence of a state of war through 
the acts of the foreign government against which the declaration is 
directed. The Constitution does not specifically vest Congress with 
the power to recognize the existence of a state of war, but it will not 
be denied th~t this power is implied and included in the power to 
declare war. Hence, it may be argued that Congress has the implied 
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power to recognize by declaration a state or condition in which war 
has in fact ceased, due to the long cessation of hostilities or to the 
complete subjugation of the enemy. Even though the international 
force of such a Congressional ~eclaration might be denied, it would 
still have domestic force with reference to the rights and duties of 
our citizens. Such a Congressional determination, as we have seen, 
has been recognized by the Supreme Court as having weight in a 
domestic sense in the case of our Civil War.'ZO If the Confederacy 
had been successful, the Civil War would doubtless have been term-
inated by a treaty of peace. As it was, the method of its termina· 
tlon differed but little from that which would be followed in the 
case of a foreign war in which the United Stat,es should completely 
subjugate the enemy and overthrow his government. 
The ground upon which the power of Congress to declare peace 
is usually based is its power to repeal any act or resolution which 
it had the power to pass. Thus, it has been said that "Congress has 
the right, simply by virtue of its power to repeal its previous enact-
ments, to declare hostilities with Germany to be at an end, and its 
declaration to this effect, once duly enacted, will be binding upon 
the Courts and the Executive alike."31 It does not necessarily fol-
low, however, that from the mere fact that Congress by act or joint 
resolution can create a status of war, it can restore peace by a simple 
repeal of its former act. This seems to have been tacitly admitted 
by the framers of the Congressional peace resolution of 1920, which 
provided not only for the repeal of the previous declaration of war 
but also expressly declared the state of war thereby created to be 
at an end. They thus assumed to exercise the power, not only to 
recognize the existence of peace by repealing the declaration of 
war, -but also to create a status of peace by Congressional resolution. 
Congress can doubtless repeal its declaration of war, but the ques-
tion is whether such repeal operates to restore peace. In the Hicks 
case, cited above, with reference to the contention that since Con-
gress alone can begin war, consequently it alone can terminate it, 
the court said: "But that does not follow because the Constitution, 
while in express terms giving Congress the sole power of declaring 
war, in no way so expresses itself as to give that body any authority 
30 U. S. v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 71. 
31 E. S. Corwin, "The Power of Congress to Declare Peace," MICHIGAN 
LAW ~VIt.W, XVIII, 674 
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itself to terminate it."32 Congress can pass an act or joint resolu-
tion admitting a state into the Union, but it would hardly be main-
tained that, after a state has once been admitted, Congress could 
expel it by a simple repeal of the act admitting it. Similarly, Con-
gress can by resolution propose a constitutional amendment to the 
state legislatures for ratification, but after the proposed amendment 
has been transmitted to the legislatures the function of Congress is 
at an end.33 ·These instances, however, merely indicate that Con-
gress cannot always undo what it has the power to do, but do not 
necessarily prove that it cannot restore peace by the repeal of the 
declaration of war. 
Light on "the question as to the power of Congress to restore peace 
may perhaps be drawn by analogy from the power of Congress to 
acquire new territory. This power also is not expressly granted in 
the Constitution to any branch of the government, but it has been 
implied from the powers to make war and to make treaties,114 but 
may also be derived from the principle that, in its international rela-
tions, the United States has such powers as international law recog-
nizes in states generally. The usual method of acquiring territory 
has been by treaty, but that method has been followed only when 
there was a ceding power with which a treaty could be made and 
which continued to exist as an independent government after the 
annexation of such territory to the United States. Texas and Ha-
waii were acquired by joint resolution of Congress. In both those 
cases, there were no governments with which to make treaties ex-
cept the governments of the territories annexed, which ceased to 
have an independent existence at the moment of annexation. Texas 
was annexed in pursuance of the express grant to Congress of the 
power to admit new states into the Union, but since Hawa~i was not 
admitted as a state, its annexation by Congress represents a greater 
extension of power. 
Another example of the acquisition of territory by Congress is 
found in the operation of the guano island act of 1856, which pro-
vides that when any citizen of the United States discovers a guano 
island not occupied by the citizens of any other government and not 
within the lawful jurisdiction of any foreign country and shall take 
.. U. S. v. Hicks, 256 Fed. 707. 
"']AM~N, THI~ CONSTITUTIONAi, CoNW:NTION, [Ist ed.], p. 505, sec. 549. 
"'American Insurance Co. v. Canter, I Pet. 5u. 
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peaceable possession 0£ the same, such island may, at the discretion 
of the President, be considered as appertaining to the United 
States.35 The question of the validity of this act arising in the Su-
preme Court, that tribunal found ample warrant for it in the prin-
ciple that, by international law, territory may be acquired by dis-
covery or occupation, as well as by cession or conquest, and when 
citizens of a nation take possession of unoccupied teqitory, the na-
tion to. which such ~itizens belong may exercise such jurisdiction as 
it sees fit over the territory so acquired.86 
In the case of acquisition of territory, the power of Congress 
to do so by statute or joint resolution is recognized as proper where 
there is no foreign government with which a treaty can appro-
priately be made. The same distinction would be followed in the 
case of the alienation of territory. If alienated to a foreign power, 
it would seem that the treaty method would have to be adopted, but 
if the alienation take place in the form of a grant of independence 
to a particular portion· of our territory, the appropriate method 
would be by statute or joint resolution.87 Similarly, in the case of 
making peace, it would seem that where the subjugation of the ene-
my by the United States and the overthrow of his government oc-
curs, since there is then no government with which to make a treaty, 
it becomes by analogy the function of Congress by act or joint reso-
lution to declare peace. Also, in the case of the long cessation of 
hostilities, since this is recognized by international law as a method 
of ending war, if there is no intention of renewing such hostilities, 
the evidence of such lack of intention might, if predicated on suffi-
cient evidence of a similar lack of intention on the part of the for-
mer enemy, be given by Congressional act or joint resolution.88 It 
has been objected that, if Congress can declare peace, it can also 
pass a law to bring the army home and thus interfere in the direc-
.. II STAT. AT L., II9. 
00 Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202. 
"'W.W. Wn.r.ouGHBY, THE CoNSTITUTIONAI. LAW oF THE UNITED STATES, 
Vol. I, p. 513. 
18 Congress could obviously not take such action by concurrent resolu-
tion, since this would be an attempt to exclude the President from an act 
of a legislative character. The joint resolution, however, could be passed 
over the President's veto, but the President could still prevent the full re-
turn of normal peace conditions by refusing to resume diplomatic relations. 
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tion of the army in the midst of a campaign.30 This would not nec-
essarily follow, but even if it did, the difficulty would be largely 
avoided by confining the power of Congress to declare peace to the 
two cases mentioned. Where, however, the government of the en-
emy has not been overthrown nor have hostilities ceased for so 
long a time as to indicate that there is no intention of renewing 
them, the only appropriate method of ending war is by the exercise 
of the treaty power. If the treaty method is followed in terminat-
ing the war, the exact date of its termination, in so far as its domes-
tic effect is concerned, may still be determined by the President, 
since the treaty of peace is put into effect in a domestic sense by 
proclamation of the President, and the date of the termination of 
the war as fixed in such proclamation need not necessarily corre-
spond with the actual date of the exchange of ratifications of the 
definitive treaty of peace. 
In the two cases mentioned,--overthrow of the enemy's govern-
ment, and long cessation of hostilities-if Congress fails to act, can 
the President bring the war to an end by proclamation? In August, 
1919, Senator Fall of New Mexico propounded the following ques-
tion to President Wilson: "In your judgment, have you not the 
power and authority, by a proclamation, to declare in appropriate 
words that peace exists and thus restore the status of peace between 
the government and people of this country and those with whom we 
declared war?" The President's reply was: "I feel constrained 
to say * * * not only that in my judgment I have not the power by 
proclamation to declare that peace exists, but that I could in no cir-
cumstances consent to take such a course prior to the ratification of 
a formal treaty of peace."40 In view of the fact that neither of the 
two conditions mentioned in which Congress can declare peace then 
e:idsted, as well as of the fact that the treaty of peace then pending 
before the Senate had been neither ratified nor rejected by that body, 
there seems to be no reason to question the correctness of the Pres-
ident's answer. But if either of these two conditions existed, it 
would seem that, by analogy with the method of ending the Civil 
War, there is some ground to suppose that the President would 
have the power in question although the question is involved in 
.. Speech of Mr. Connally in House of Representatives, CoNG~SSlONAI. 
Rf:coRD, April 8, 1920, vol. 59, p. 5773. 
•• CoNG~sioNAL R£coRD, Aug. 22, 1919, pp. 4434 4435. 
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some doubt. In one case, as we have seen, the Supreme Court 
seemed· to recognize the dates of the termination of the Civil War 
as depending on the proclamations of the President, without consid-
ering the concurrent action of Congress.u The dates chosen by the 
President in .his proclamation, however, were sanctioned by a subse-
quent act of Congress, and the Supreme Court in other cases seems 
to consider the action of Congress as of substantial if not controlling 
weight in determining the end of the Civil War.42 The situation 
with reference to $e power in question seems analogous to that 
witli reference to the power to permit limited intercourse with the 
enemy in time of war. In each case, it would seem that the Pres-
ident alone may exercise the power, though probably not if against 
the expressed will of Congress; but, whether so or not, he may exer-
cise it with the concurrent authority of Congress.43 In the absence 
of any conflicting action on the part of Congress, the courts would 
doubtless consider themselves bound by the President's proclama-
tion in determining private rights, as, in the case of the Protector, 
the Supreme Court considered it.self so bound, "in the absence of 
more certain criteria, of equally general application."44 
JOHN M. MATHEWS. 
University of Illinois. 
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1 The Protector, 12 Wall. 700 . 
.. U. S. v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 71. 
/ .. Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 73. In this connection it may be pointed 
out that certain war-time acts of Congress indicate that, in the opinion of 
that body, the President alone by proclamation could at least recognize the 
termination of war for the purpose of indicating the period during which 
such legislation should operate. See, e. g., 40 STAT. AT L., 4I2. 
" 12 Wall. 700. 
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